CONDONATION OF DELAY AND SUFFICIENT CAUSE UNDER THE LIMITATION ACT OF 1963

Condonation of delay is the doctrine mentioned in the Limitation Act, 1963. This doctrine is an exception to the general rule i.e. Bar of Limitation under the act.

The main objective of the Limitation Act, 1963 is to primarily provide a bar upon the time limit within which the aggrieved party can institute a suit, application, or appeal in the court. The term limitation can be interpreted as the restrictions or the rule or circumstances which are limited. It means the circumstances under which the legal remedy is obtained is barred by the time as per the law. The law of limitation specifically prescribes a particular time limit during which an aggrieved party shall approach to court to receive the legal remedy. As per the law of limitation, no court shall have the jurisdiction to try a suit, or entertain an application or appeal, if it is filled after the prescribed period. This prescribed period has been specifically highlighted under the schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals with the doctrine of condonation of delay, as the name suggests condonation can be termed as an implied pardon of an offense by treating the offender as if it had not been committed. And Condonation of delay means the extension of prescribed time in certain cases subject to sufficient cause. It states that if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had a sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period, then such an application or appeal shall be admitted after the prescribed period. The concept of condoning a delay is primarily preferred to applications and appeal and does not cover the suits. The rationale behind not covering the suits is that this doctrine is regarded as the exception to the general rule of the Limitation Act.

If there is any situation of the suit, appeal is preferred, and application is made after the prescribed period the suit shall be dismissed. But the Limitation Act is not a defense so that there is any extension in the particular suit which is given by the Sections 4 to 24 which deals with the “prescribed period” these sections will be considered. As for “suit” extension is of 3 to 12 years and for “appeal” and “application” it is for 6 months, some concession is allowed to the appeal and application. If the suit is included in the Section 5 of the Act, then Section 3 of the act will be irrelevant and will have no effect. Therefore, Section 5 is an exception to the rule laid down in Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It does not include execution proceedings.

In Ram Kali Kuer v. Indradeo Chaudhary [AIR 1985 Pat 148]

It was held that Section 5 does not provide that an application in writing must be filed before relief under the said provision can be granted.

In Ashok v. Rajendra Bhausaheb Mulak [2012 (11) JT 18: 2012 (10) SCALE 430]

It was held that a bona fide mistake on the part of the council in pursuing a remedy is a good ground for condonation of delay in approaching the right forum in the right kind of proceedings.

In IOCL v. Subrata Borah Chowlek [ (2010) 12 SCALE 209: 2010 (262) ELT 3]

It was held that though Section 5 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the court, and makes no distinction between the state and the citizens, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of Government, which is dependent on the actions of its official, who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions may lead to grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such cases. The court should not be lenient enough which would permit the parties to tamper with the legal right so acquired. The condonation of delay is a remedy and not a right to the aggrieved party. Even if the party successfully provides a sufficient cause, the courts have the discretionary power to deal with the application of condonation of delay.

SUFFICIENT CAUSE

The term “Sufficient cause” isn’t defined explicitly and varies on a case-to-case basis. The Court has a wide discretion in determining what constitutes as sufficient cause, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In cases regarding non-appearance, adjournment or stay of execution of a decree, the cause must be just and adequate i.e. “sufficient” otherwise these provisions will just be a way of incessantly prolonging litigation. This principle has been advocated in furtherance of pursuance of justice but it shouldn’t deny someone of justice either.

The two rules were laid down with regards to the expression sufficient cause by the Court.

• The cause must be beyond the control of the invoking.

• The parties must not be lacking bona fide, not be shown to be negligent or inactive.

In the case of G. Ramagowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ AIR 1988 SC 897 ]

It was held that “sufficient cause” is to be interpreted liberally so as to pursue substantial justice. The Court has the discretion to condone the delay and admit the appeal. The Court has discretionary jurisdiction and even though sufficient cause has been shown, the party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as the same is left to the Court’s discretion.

Exceptions to Condonation of Delay – Section 5

There are certain exceptions relating to the ambit of the doctrine of condonation of delay (Section 5): This doctrine is applicable to Criminal Proceedings only.

2. The doctrine does not include “suit” and only covers appeals and applications.
3. Other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The doctrine covers all appeals and applications.

General Principles of the Condonation of delay

The Supreme Court, in the case of Collector Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [AIR 1987 SC 1353] prescribed certain principles which need to be followed while administering the doctrine of condonation of delay:

• Ordinarily, the litigant doesn’t stand to benefit by instituting an appeal late.

• If the Court is refusing to condone the delay, it can result in a meritorious matter being discarded and the roots of justice being defeated. However, when a delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that the case will be decided on merits, i.e. a decision based on evidence rather than on the technical and procedural ground.

• Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean the doctrine is to be applied in an irrational manner. It must be applied in a sensible manner and not a literal one.

• Between substantial justice and technical considerations, the former deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim that injustice is done because of a bona fide delay.

• There is no presumption that delay is caused deliberately. The litigant has nothing to gain by resorting to delay and runs a serious risk.

Instances where delay in condonation can be granted

The following are the instances where condonation can be granted:

1. Subsequent changes in the law.

2. Illness of the party: It includes the nature and severity of disease and facts encompassing the failure to act.

3. Imprisonment of the party: However, mere detainment is not sufficient to cause. Varies on a case-to-case basis.

4. Party is a pardanashin woman.

5. Party belongs to a minority group with insufficient funds.

6. Poverty or paupers.

7. Party is a government servant: A government servant may not have an incentive in fulfilling the task. Therefore, a certain latitude is permissible in such a case.

8. Delay due to the pendency of the writ petition.

9. Party is illiterate.

10. Other adequate grounds: Mistake of Court, Mistake of Counsel, Delay in getting copies, mislead by rulings, etc.

In Ramlal, Motilal & Chotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 361]

In this case, the Court held that while interpreting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, two important considerations need to be made. In case of expiry of prescribed period of prescription, a right in favour of the decree-holder arises, according to which the decree can be treated as binding between the parties. If sufficient cause of delay in filing appeal has been given, it is the Court’s discretion to condone the delay and admit the appeal. The fact that the appellant was misled by tools of the High Court in computing the limitation period is sufficient cause under Section 5 to condone the delay. And the appeal was granted.

In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari     [AIR 1869 SC 575]

In this case, the question before the Court was whether the delay in filing appeal should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. As laid down in this case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act gives Court discretion, which has to be exercised in a way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon well-understood principles. The words “sufficient cause” need to receive a liberal construction. The Bench of three Judges held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. The appeal was allowed and the delay was condoned.

CONCLUSION

The Law of Limitation and Condonation of Delay are two effective tools for effective litigation and quick disposal of cases. The Law of Limitation ensures that the case is filed within the prescribed period so as to avoid unnecessary delays and is the epitome of the maxim, Vigilantibus non dormentibus jura subvenitent. On the other hand, condonation of delay is the safeguard to the law of limitation and bars certain cases in which the delay in filing the suit is justifiable, i.e. can be backed by having “sufficient cause”. There are cases where the Court didn’t allow condoning the delay of one day, and there are cases where the Court excuses delay of several years. It varies from case-to-case and the Court has discretionary jurisdiction to determine whether a case is suitable for condonation or not.